Full Article on the 1925 Geneva Opium Protocol and Agreement
Introduction
On February 11, 1925, in Geneva, a series of major agreements and protocols concerning the regulation of opium were signed by several nations. This initiative aimed to strengthen measures for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture, trade and use of prepared opium. These agreements were established within the framework of the First Opium Conference and are a supplement to the International Opium Convention of January 23, 1912.
Geneva Agreement
The Agreement was signed by the British Empire (with India), China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and Siam. These countries undertook to take all necessary steps to gradually suppress the use of prepared opium in their Far Eastern possessions and territories, including leased or protected territories. The main articles of the Agreement were:
Article 1 : The importation, sale and distribution of opium shall be a State monopoly, and the manufacture of prepared opium for sale shall also be a State monopoly where circumstances permit. Retail systems shall ensure effective supervision.
Article II : The sale of opium to minors is prohibited and all measures must be taken to prevent the spread of the habit of opium smoking among minors.
Article III : Minors are not allowed to enter smoking rooms.
Article IV : The Contracting Powers shall restrict the number of retail shops and smoking dens in countries where they are permitted.
Article V : The purchase and sale of "dross" (opium residue) is prohibited, unless the "dross" is sold to the monopoly.
Article VI :
The export of opium, raw or prepared, from territories where the importation of opium intended for smoking is maintained, is prohibited.
Transit or transshipment of prepared opium is also prohibited in these territories.
Transit or transhipment of raw opium is prohibited unless an import certificate providing adequate guarantees against illicit use is presented.
Article VII : The Contracting Powers shall promote the fight against the use of prepared opium by education and the distribution of pamphlets.
Article VIII : The Contracting Powers must assist each other in combating smuggling by direct exchanges of information.
Article IX : The Powers should consider the possibility of taking legislative measures to punish illegal transactions carried out by persons resident in their territories but carried out in foreign countries.
Article X : The Powers will furnish information on the number of opium smokers to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for publication.
Article XI : The Agreement does not cover opium intended for medical and scientific purposes.
Article XII : The Powers shall meet periodically to review the application of Chapter II of the Hague Convention of 1912 and of this Agreement.
Article XIII : The Agreement applies only to the Far Eastern possessions and territories of the Powers, including the protected territories. The Powers may exclude certain territories at the time of ratification.
Article XIV : The Agreement shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force after the receipt of two ratifications, with effect for each Power 90 days after receipt of its ratification.
Article XV : Denunciation of the Agreement shall be notified to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and shall take effect one year after the notification.
Protocol Annex
The Protocol, signed as a supplement to the Agreement, aims to strengthen the commitments and facilitate the execution of the obligations stipulated in Article VI of the 1912 Hague Convention:
Article I : The provisions of the Agreement reinforce the obligations of the signatory States under Article VI of the Hague Convention.
Article II : The signatory States shall strengthen measures to reduce the consumption of prepared opium within a maximum period of fifteen years after the decision referred to.
Article III : A commission will be responsible for verifying the implementation of the provisions by the producing countries.
Article IV : If the provisions are not effectively implemented, States may report the facts to the Council of the League of Nations to consider what measures should be taken.
Article V : Before the expiry of the fifteen-year period, the signatory States will examine the measures to be taken for inveterate poisoners.
Article VI : States will coordinate their efforts to completely eliminate the use of prepared opium, calling for collaboration among producing countries to end illicit traffic.
Article VII : The Protocol will enter into force with the Agreement signed on February 11, 1925.
Article VIII : Any State represented at the Conference may accede to the Protocol at any time after its entry into force.
The 1925 Geneva Opium Protocol, while displaying humanitarian and drug regulation objectives, has controversial and critical aspects that deserve careful reflection. Here is a critical analysis:
Implicit Motives and Colonial Control : The text of the Protocol reveals underlying intentions that go beyond the mere regulation of drugs. The establishment of a state monopoly and the restrictions imposed on the production and distribution of opium appear to be means for the colonial powers to maintain strict control over the territories of the Far East. This centralization of power and resources in the hands of the colonial authorities was often used to exploit the natural wealth and human resources of the colonies. The prohibition of the export of raw opium, while allowing its trade under strict control, could also be seen as a strategy to preserve economic profits for the Western powers while depriving the producing regions of their economic autonomy.
Impact on Local Populations : The policy of gradual suppression, although presented as a measure for the well-being of the populations, has often ignored local socio-economic realities. Local communities that depended on poppy cultivation for their livelihoods have often suffered from these policies, with serious consequences for their economy and food security. Efforts to eliminate opium use, without an approach adapted to local contexts, can exacerbate suffering and create situations of scarcity and crisis.
Application Failure and Smuggling : Attempts to regulate the opium trade often failed, partly because of inadequate measures to combat smuggling and illicit use. Black markets flourished, often fueled by persistent demand in areas where opium was culturally entrenched. The difficulty of controlling borders and trade routes demonstrated the limits of externally imposed regulatory efforts.
Inequality and International Politics : The Geneva Protocol also illustrates the inequalities in the international drug regulation system. The signatory powers, largely European and imperialist, imposed their own standards and policies on the regions they controlled. This reflects an international hierarchy where decisions on drug policy are made by nations that do not always have an understanding or respect for local contexts.
In conclusion, while the 1925 Geneva Protocol aimed to regulate opium use in a humanitarian manner, it also reflected the power and control dynamics of colonial powers over the territories they dominated. The impact of these policies was often more harmful than beneficial for local populations, exacerbating inequalities and economic tensions while allowing colonial powers to maintain their economic and political control over opium-producing regions.
Ratifications :
BRITISH EMPIRE (17 FEBRUARY 1926) The signature of this Protocol is subject, in respect of the British protectorates, to the conditions set out in Article XIII of the Agreement.
Myanmar (17 Fev 1926)
INDIA (17 fev 1926)
FRANCE (29 apr 1926)
JAPAN (10 oct 1928)
THE NETHERLANDS ( including the Dutch East Indies, Suriname and Curaçao) (1 mar 1927)
PORTUGAL (13 sep 1926) While accepting the principle of monopoly, as formulated in Article 1, it undertakes, as regards the date on which the measures provided for in the first paragraph will enter into force, only subject to the provision of paragraph 2 of the same article. The Portuguese Government, being bound by a contract in conformity with the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1912, shall not be able to implement the stipulations of paragraph 1 of Article VI of this Agreement, as long as the obligations arising from this contract persist.
THAILAND (6 mai 1927) Reservation made in respect of Article I, paragraph 3 (a), as to the date on which this provision shall come into force, and reservation made in respect of Article V. The reason for these reservations was explained by the First Delegate of Thailand on November 14, 1924. The Thai Government hopes to bring the registration and rationing system into force within the period of three years; at the end of this period the reservation in respect of Article I, paragraph 3 (a), will lapse.
